This chapter reports on the main findings from a survey of entrepreneurship and small private enterprises in Qingdao (Shandong Province) and Harbin (Heilongjiang Province). The survey1 consisted of questionnaires distributed to existing small private enterprises (both Getihuand siying-qiye). Additional information (not reported on here) was obtained from unemployed and laid-off workers (xiagang) on issues relating to establishing and growing a small private enterprise.
POLICY CONTEXT

Importance of small enterprises in economic reform
China's economic structure is changing rapidly. Privately owned firms, all but illegal 15 years ago, make up around 30 per cent of the country's economy. In 1997 it was estimated that more than half of Chinese economic activity stemmed from the private or household sector (IFC 2000) , and this share could have reached twothirds of economic activity by this year. Small-scale private enterprises (those with fewer than 100 employees) in particular are driving the Chinese restructuring and reform process. The key is employment-with small and medium-sized private enterprises being a policy cornerstone in soaking up unemployment generated by lay-offs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and displacement of rural workers. From reported to have been around 10 million xiagang (or laid-off SOE workers) currently needing new jobs, as well as 7.3 million registered unemployed, and there are over 150 million surplus rural labourers also in need of alternative jobs.
2 The Chinese Government is beginning to recognise the vital role that the emerging small, private enterprise sector will have in soaking up these jobless workers and new entrants to the labour force and building a new framework for the Chinese economy.
There are also other very important roles for the small to medium enterprise private sector. These include: provision of business service infrastructure required by larger firms-China's traditional mainstay; rapidly expanding and bringing China's services sector into the new millennium; acting as a source of innovation and being an important vehicle for getting new products or services to market; and building a broader base for the economy-allowing it to rely less on key enterprises in key industries in particular regions.
Legal structures of private enterprises
The recent history of economic policy and market reform and its impact on private sector development has been well summarised in the 2000 IFC report, China's Emerging Private Enterprises, and in the companion volume by economists from the Australian National University (Garnaut et al. 2001 ).
There are two main legal structures for small to medium-sized private enterprises in urban China: individual or household-owned enterprises (Getihu) and small to medium-scale private enterprises (Siying Qiye or limited liability companies). In addition, although numbers are much smaller, there are a variety of other legal structures such as urban collectives and township and village enterprises (most of which have converted or are converting to Siying Qiye), shareholder or public companies listed on the stock market, partnerships, and foreign-invested enterprises Goint equity venture, contractual jOint venture and wholly-owned foreign companies).
Getihu are owned and operated by an individual or family and are permitted to hire up to seven people. They operate with total liability but without standard accounting systems, are not required to declare and register Registered Capital, and are subject to a district government-determined income tax based on a certain percentage of estimated revenue in their sector (an average 8 per cent in the cities surveyed).
Siying qiye are limited liability firms with 2-50 shareholders, can employ more than seven people, and have a variable minimum Registered Capital depending on sector categories. These enterprises operate under 1988 laws, modified in 1994, and are subject to normal Chinese company income tax and a VAT or business tax.
There is also a new legal structure in China for solely-owned private enterprises, with limited liability and minimum registered capital of RMB 1.00, which operate using standard accounting systems, and are subject to company tax. These new enterprises operate under the 1999 Solely-Owned Business Law.
Establishing and developing a small private enterprise This survey looks specifically at the small end of the private sector business spectrum in China and the institutional and regulatory challenges facing this sector. One of the compelling reasons for this research was the limited amount of previous research on this end of the market-despite the very large numbers of these enterprises.
Another reason was the perception in China that very small, new-start enterprises have a significant role as a vehicle for getting the unemployed and xiagangback to work and for employing the great bulk of new entrants to the labour force. This makes this end of the small business sector particularly important in terms of economic and labour policy and social stability.
In China, the perception is that many small enterprises start as Getihucharacterised as a small shop or transport operation run by a husband and wife, or a home-based business. Running your own business is seen as a real option for people who were laid-off from SOEs, or registered as unemployed. Such new-start enterprises often involve the whole family in the early stages, and often use the home as a base of operations as a way of reducing set-up costs. This pathway to employment is important, as China's unemployed and xiagang are typically disadvantaged in the labour market, with low-level qualifications and poor prospects of finding alternative employment.
A compounding positive impact of new business formation, especially new businesses formed by people disadvantaged in the labour market, arises when these new businesses are managed well, and start taking on their own staff. With limited financial backing, these new businesses are generally labour rather than capital intensive, and may well grow to offer employment opportunities for other unemployed and xiagang. This research focuses on issues faCing the starting and developing of small private businesses, as a way of identifying key barriers to start-up and development, and the policy changes and support structures most likely to foster growth.
The number of small private firms in the two survey areas is estimated to be large, and is growing rapidly (Table 21 .1).
Survey methodology
Surveying very small firms is difficult in most countries, and China is no exception. Particular difficulties hinge on access, trust and honesty of feedback. Many newstart business operators are uncomfortable with people they do not know who ask questions about their business, especially when they are 'officials'. They may be uncooperative, or even obtuse in their feedback-saying what they think the interviewer wants to hear.
To reduce these sampling risks, the survey was tested and modified, the survey teams (coordinated by the China Society for Research on Economic Systems Reform with help from local SCORES officials) were trained in survey techniques, and particular emphasis was placed on the value of honest responses in helping create a better operating environment for small enterprises.
Two survey modes were used-questionnaires for self-completion, and face-toface interviews. Table 21 .2 shows the matrix of responses by business type, survey mode and city. In addition to the business survey responses that are reported here, a sample of unemployed people (of various types) who were planning on starting businesses was also surveyed. The results of those surveys are not covered in this paper.
The businesses surveyed were not selected randomly. Six industry groups were selected for particular attention (information technology, business services, retailing, catering/restaurants, community services, and light manufacturing). Businesses were identified through registers, networks and by their location.
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS
The survey focused on businesses in six industries (Table 21. Note: * Unless otherwise noted, the capital unit is 1,000 yuan.
" community service sector (9 per cent) such as home help, aged care, childcare, deliveries " light manufacturing (16 per cent) such as clothing, handicrafts and piece work outsourcing.
Two-thirds of the businesses surveyed were under five years old, including 11 per cent less than one year old (Table 21. Most of the operators reported that they work long hours-with operators of Getihu businesses working slightly longer than operators of Siying Qiye businesses (Table   21 .5). Very few of the businesses surveyed were 'part-time' businesses, with over half the operators surveyed reporting that they work 8 to 12 hours per day. A further 14 per cent reported that they work 12 to 14 hours per day.
Looked at by region, it appears that business operators in faster-growing Qingdao City were working slightly longer hours than their counterparts in Harbin.
Operators were mostly male (69 per cent), relatively young (57 per cent under 40 years old) and quite well educated (27.9 per cent having university or postgraduate degrees and 37.9 per cent having college qualifications).
On a range of social indicators (car ownership, home ownership and schooling preferences) the small-scale entrepreneurs seemed to be generally reasonably well off, despite their young average age. 
MAIN SURVEY FINDINGS
The survey was designed to focus on issues relating to establishing and developing a small business in China, particularly as a means to employment for xiagang (Iaidoff workers). Of the respondent SME operators, 65 per cent used to work for SOEs (that is, are laid-off workers).
The survey findings suggest that, contrary to generally held views, small enterprises (Siying Qiye and Getihu) are generally not home-based businesses, and do not rely heavily on family members as employees. Overall, just under 13 per cent of respondent businesses were based at home, and just under 7 per cent of employees were family members.
One of the biggest issues in setting up a small private enterprise in China is access to start-up capital. A particular impediment is the requirement for lodging proof of Registered Capital for Siying Qiye, whereby new businesses must, as part of their registration process, prove that they have certain minimum amounts of fixed assets and liquid funds available. The amount varies by legal status and industry (for example, from 100,000 yuan for consulting and personal services, to 300,000 yuan for retail businesses and 500,000 yuan for manufacturing and processing), but such registered capital requirement is not needed for Getihu operations. The rationale behind the Registered Capital requirements is not to ensure that new-start businesses have development capital, but rather to ensure that debtors can be paid if the venture bankrupts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many new-start small entrepreneurs beg and borrow funds from family and friends for just long enough to prove they have the amounts required, then return the borrowed funds.
Problems in raising start-up and Registered Capital are exacerbated by weaknesses in the banking system that make it very difficult for small enterprises to borrow funds, unless they have equivalent funds that can be put up as surety. The survey showed that just 10.5 per cent of respondents used a bank to source their start-up capital (20.6). By far the most important sources were own savings (51.8 percent), investors (19.8 per cent), and borrowings from friends or family (19.7 per cent).
The high emphasis on own or family finance raises an important question-in the absence of alternatives, is family wealth a prerequisite to starting a business. The amount of start-up capital required for Siying Qiye was often quite large-8i per cent requiring over 50,000 RMB for Registered Capital, including 52.5 per cent requiring over 300,000 RMB (Table 21 .7).
Turnover trends reported by respondents were very positive-which should be expected, given China's high economic growth rate. Perhaps surprisingly, a lower percentage of respondents from Qingdao than Harbin reported increasing turnover over the previous three years, despite Qingdao's recent history of strong economic growth.
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The survey asked respondents specifically about barriers they had faced in setting up their business (Table 21 .9). The biggest barrier, in both cities, was start-up capital (nominated by a total of 58.4 per cent of respondents). The importance of this issue
has also been identified in other surveys (for example, Song 2001 and IFC 2000) .
The next two barriers related to the difficult bureaucratic environment facing small enterprises in China. Government regulations were nominated as a barrier by 28.8
per cent of respondents. These consisted of (in order of importance): limitations of Red tape is a common concern for small businesses in many countries. The main source of this frustration is the multiple roles of the small business owner, which means the main entrepreneur and manager is also the main administrator. Time spent by the small business owner in dealing with red tape is time away from developing the business. The survey sought information on how much time the small business operators spend on reporting to government, and the average was .. finding quality staff (8 per cent)
.. consumer confidence (6 per cent)
.. lack of time/hours in the day (6 per cent)
.. GST (6 per cent)
.. government financial regulations (5 per cent).
With access to capital being the biggest barrier facing start-up businesses in the two cities, the survey sought more detailed information on the nature of capital required, uses, possible sources, and difficulties in accessing the various sources.
The survey found that 73.2 per cent of respondents will be looking for expansion capital in the next 12 months (67.2 per cent of Harbin respondents and 84.2 per cent of Qingdao respondents). The uses of expansion capital are shown in Table 21 .10. Respondents were also invited to comment on the difficulties they expected to run into in accessing expansion capital ( .. product or service knowledge (15 per cent).
Respondents were also invited to indicate their preferred mode of acquiring their desired business development skills (Table 21 .13). The responses show a marked difference between the cities, with operators in Qingdao clearly showing a preference for face-to-face modes like training and seminars, while a very large 41 per cent of respondents from Harbin nominated books or handbooks. Respondents from both cities rated coaching, mentoring and one-to-one advice very low on the list. This is likely to be due to an almost complete absence of creditable providers of these services in these two cities.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The survey findings show that while the number of small enterprises in China is growing, there are significant impediments to establishing and developing a small private business. Three key themes are bureaucratic obstacles, lack of business skills, and difficulties in accessing finance. 
Access to finance
Improving access to formal financial markets by small private enterprises will be essential if this pivotal sector is to play the necessary role of soaking up structural unemployment in China. It is a complex problem, and a seven-step process to reform small enterprise financing in China is outlined below
• Address the perception by banks that small enterprises are an unacceptable credit risk. This requires training of bank loan assessors and credit managers, more sophisticated assessment processes, working through intermediaries like accountants and business incubators to improve company assets and profiV loss assessments and reduce business failure rates, and application forms that include requirements for sound business planning.
• Establish city-level small business support funds, possibly linked to employment of a certain level of xiagang and the unemployed.
• Seriously evaluate the performance of the existing SME Credit Guarantee Agency system-followed either by reform (if required) or closure of the Agency and diversion of city funds to other city-based intermediary organisations (since its establishment in 1999, the credit guarantee system has shown itself to be risk-averse, duplicating the services of the state banking sector, and servicing only medium-scale SOEs, not the private sector).
• Policy initiatives to develop small and community-based banks or credit cooperatives to better serve local small enterprises (the five new private banks currently under consideration for approval by the China Banking Regulatory Commission are a start in the creation of a proper capital market in China, but this does not go far enough).
• Attract foreign banks into China by 2005, under WTO accession rules.
• Introduce and finance urban micro-credit facilities to the small-scale enterprise and Getihu sector-funded by city governments and channelled through city Commercial Banks (the former urban credit cooperatives) and/or intermediary organisations such as business incubators.
• Formalise the large 'grey capital market' in China and partially remove informal (illegal) private household and company lending by initiating or allowing other forms of capital raising. As well, it would be of great benefit to direct some of China's high volumes of household savings through special small enterprise credit facilities, with variable bank interest rates, and to formalise and secure the legal status of contracts. 
